Appendix - Detailed Comments

Comments made in the main text of this report are not repeated in the appendix. There are no comments on the Executive Summary since these would duplicate what appears later. Repetition of comments in the appendix is due to repetition of faults in the report.

Page/Column

7/1

The Panel's World Wide Web site is very poor, with the selection of listed items incomprehensible.

7/2

The process included round table discussions on specific topics, e.g., ethics. However, this meant that only those living within easy access of the location for that hearing could participate in discussing that topic. Presumably an invitation was also required: although I made substantial submissions on ethics, and had urged that the topic should be discussed, I was not invited to participate in the round table on that topic. There is no evidence in the report of the round tables having proved useful.

9/2

The wording of 2.1.3 implies that high-level wastes from reprocessing would be in liquid form. In fact, they would be in solid glass blocks by the time they became wastes from the reprocessing plant.

13/1

While it is true that there is enough space to accommodate the wastes on-site, as stated at 135/1, this does not mean that there is "enough storage capacity", i.e., more wet or dry storage capacity would have to be built.

14/1

The statement that "the AECB does not have jurisdiction over the social, economic and lifestyle issues associated with nuclear development" is at odds with the the AECB's endorsement of the ALARA principle which includes the rider "social and economic factors taken into account".

15/2

The word "minimize" is misused when describing an optimization that balances risk and cost.

16/1

The Panel, in recommending common risk criteria for radiation and chemicals, ignores the argument against this course, both in the document it quotes and in submissions. Briefly, there should not be a single acceptable risk for all activities: rather the acceptable risk for an activity should be commensurate with its benefits.

16/2

There is no evidence that a lack of a "social consensus" is the only reason for there being no disposal facilities for nuclear fuel wastes. In stating that "acceptance of disposal seems unlikely to come quickly or easily" is little more than a guess based on the Panel's own unique definition of "acceptance".

17/2

There is an implicit unjustified assumption in the wording that the submissions reflect societal values. The report fails to note the inconsistency in submissions that promoted recycling for everything except nuclear fuel.

18/1

The Panel notes deep societal divisions over "world views" between participants at the hearings, but errs in extrapolating this to society at large. Canadians are not revolutionaries and most fall into the broad middle ground in this respect. It is this majority, ignored by the Panel, that is likely to find the concept acceptable.

18/1

In addressing the "dread factor" the report fails to consider how this could be reduced by a clear and authoritative statement that the concept has been found adequately safe, and that radiation protection standards are well founded. Other technologies, now widely accepted, experienced this factor. Early cars had to be preceded by a flagman; people believed that train travel at speeds over ten miles per hour would make them ill; and electric light switches bore the sign "The use of Electricity is in no way harmful to health, not does it affect the soundness of sleep". The report refers to worst-case scenarios without pointing out that some, contributing to participants' dread factor, are not just extremely unlikely, they are inconceivable. Does the Panel really believe that a single accident could lead to the extinction of life on earth? If not, it is irresponsible in failing to dismiss such scare-mongering.

18/2

The report notes objections to the concept advanced by some participants without providing any of the rebuttals that were submitted. For instance, some participants believed that a better solution would be found in the future. Regardless of how likely this is, it would always be possible to postulate something better just over the horizon so that there would never be a decision; and that the Panel was not required to find the best solution but whether the proposed concept is acceptable.

20/1

The statement that "This wide public discussion did not take place" is true but misleading. The opportunity for such discussion occurred at Ontario's Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning, at the Interfaith Program for Public Awareness on Nuclear Issues and at this Panel's hearings. The absence of discussion refutes the Panel's assumption of widespread public concern. With very few exceptions, only dedicated proponents and opponents have attended these discussions.

23/1

Different cost estimates are quoted here and on page 17.

30/1

"Implications" in the heading of 3.5 is misleading in that the section contains participants' concerns and some Panel opinions.

30/2

The argument that most participants did not discuss "other subject areas" because these were not well covered in the EIS is false: many participants discussed topics that were excluded by the Panel's terms of reference. The Canadian Shield is said to be "relatively sensitive". Relative to what? Sensitive to what? Certainly the trees and lakes are sensitive to acid rain from coal-fired plants.

31/1

Any "high levels of stress" or strain in "social cohesion", like the "dread factor", cannot be separated from the nature of the Panel's report. The Panel had the opportunity to assuage some of these concerns by clearly separating technical and perceived safety, but failed to do so, and so must share the responsibility for them. The Bruce and Chalk River areas are examples of communities that might have been expected to suffer from such stress and strain, but do not exhibit any symptoms.

31/2

The bottom paragraph poses rhetorical questions without advising the reader that they had already been answered on pages 17 and 28. If the Panel did not accept these answers it should have resolved the differences, and not have left uncertainty in the readers' minds.

32/1

The Social Implications noted here are not unique to this concept but would be common to all industrial projects. It is a fact of life than in any community some people want development and change while others oppose them. If such development is prohibited many residents of northern Canada will have the options of mining, lumbering (both demonstrably more dangerous than the nuclear industry), welfare or emigration to the south.

32/2

Again the report quotes participants' fears without noting that they have been answered. In this instance concerning transportation the Panel has expressed its view on the previous page that any risk from radiation would be much less than the conventional transportation risks, and these would not be unusually high.

33/1

It is not true to claim that neither safety nor acceptability can be measured. The insurance industry is based on actuarial tables that measure safety. Every election measures acceptability. What are needed are clear definitions and rigorous means of measurement.

34/1

It is not sufficient for the Panel to have used just personal and participants' views in judging acceptability. This ignores 30 million Canadians. It is similarly ridiculous to claim that "the public is demanding more openness, public scrutiny and debate, and shared decision-making". A vociferous minority is demanding these on each issue affecting their special interest but there is no evidence that the public at large is "demanding" them. Quite the reverse. Very few true members of the public attend inquiry hearings, or AEC Board meetings. Most people are too busy living their lives to be social activists. With or without public acceptance, "vigorous opposition" can be expected from those dedicated to opposing nuclear energy at every opportunity. The wording here perpetuates the myth, propagated by critics, that the Canadian nuclear industry has not been open with information. The Panel was repeatedly urged to challenge those claiming a lack of openness to state what they had requested that had been denied, and any reason given.

35/1

One of the Panel's criteria for acceptance is that the proponent and regulator should be "trustworthy". This is reasonable as worded here but subsequently "trustworthy" is equated to "trusted". As a consequence, the Panel rejects some organizations from the implementation stage because they were not trusted by some participations, even though no evidence was advanced to show them untrustworthy. This matter of trust is closely linked to the belief in myths, such as lack of openness, which the Panel did nothing to dispel.

36/1

"input from social and applied scientists" represents a possible means to an end, not an end in itself.

36/1

"Thus, Aboriginal people should design it (the concept)" is totally illogical. Because one group may be affected by something does not mean that they should control it. By this argument, the nuclear industry should design the concept, since it will be affected by it.

37/1

The desire to be "independent of conflict of interest" is a worthy principle in isolation. However, there should also be recognition of another worthy principle, that those producing wastes should be responsible for their safe and responsible disposal that is part of the federal government's policy. The report itself states at 2.1.8.3: "According to the 'polluter pays' principle, producers and owners are to fund, organize, manage and operate waste disposal and other management facilities."

37/2

The three safety criteria b), c) and d) could be combined in one: "be based on a sound and thorough analysis endorsed in peer review".

38/1

The Panel is naive in believing that any amount of participation would result in agreement on worst-case scenarios. Many submissions to the hearings demonstrated how unrealistic are some people's beliefs of what may be worst-cases. The Panel encouraged participation but did nothing to correct these misconceptions.

38/2

The requirement for "the best available technologies" will probably be interpreted as "the best, regardless of cost and other factors". This would be inconsistent with the ALARA principle and the whole thrust of the report that social factors must be taken into consideration. Demanding an expensive technology that makes one activity much safer than others constitutes a misuse of limited resources and hence is contrary to the wellbeing of society as a whole. "optimized to reduce risk" represents another distortion of the ALARA principle: optimization does not necessarily reduce the risk. The Panel's SRG stressed the need for cost effectiveness (39/1), as did the Auditor General of Canada in his 1995 report. Evidence of the proposed technologies having performed safely elsewhere is desirable but should not be essential: if this were enforced universally nothing new could ever be introduced.

44/1

Again the report quotes concerns that were expressed without any indication that responses were provided. To ask whether something is "safe or is not safe" is meaningless: the report has already pointed out that safety is not an absolute (33/1). The ability to weld the containers was not in question, but whether freedom from defects in the weld could be assured.

44/2

The CCEER is wrong in stating that professional experts tend to focus on probabilities: they define risk as the product of probability and consequence.

45/2

While confirmation of a model by comparison with a natural analogue is desirable, it should not be an essential criterion, as in the present wording.

49/2

The majority faction writing the report correctly notes that: "if decisions are not taken, Canada will run the risk of becoming dependent on outside technical skills to solve its own problem of managing nuclear fuel wastes". The minority faction apparently did not recognize the risk. Even this solution implicitly assumes that other countries do not adopt the Panel's preference for indecision.

50/1

The Energy Probe quotation is misleading. $13 billion is not required now but only when there are ten million bundles for disposal, i.e., about ten times the present inventory.

50/2

"Society must be confident that human institutions will have the knowledge and capacity to manage a risky situation ...." is one of the best reasons for favouring disposal that does not require institutional intervention. The section on technical safety has already concluded that any "scientific uncertainties" are insufficient to cause rejection of the concept. Those assessing "Safety from a Social Perspective" are not competent to second-guess that finding. As argued in the main text, this whole section is not relevant to safety, but to acceptance.

51/1

The scientific community will always be divided on any issue, in that there will never be absolute unanimity. It is therefore necessary to assess the quality and quantity of the dissent. The Panel majority appear to have done this in finding the concept adequately robust. It is not acceptable for the Panel to state at this stage simply that "Some participants questioned ...." without providing an answer and evaluating the qualifications of those participants. The report is according equal importance to detailed, documented and peer-reviewed analyses and unsubstantiated opinions, or even questions.

53/1

The report, like many submissions, fails to mention that R-104 includes the requirement that if predicted risk do not peak before 10,000 years, further "reasoned arguments" must be provided. It is technically correct but misleading in stating that R-104 does not reflect the latest ICRP recommendations: the fundamental criterion is risk, not dose, so that the dose limit at any time will depend on the conversion factor that the AECB endorses. The fact that radionuclides remain in the wastes after 100,000 years is irrelevant if by then the wastes are no more radioactive, no less corrosion resistant and no more accessible than natural ore bodies. The reference to the U.S. repository at Yucca Mountain is similarly irrelevant: that site is initially dry so that long-term predictions of an increased release would presumably be due to assumed entry of water, whereas the concept in the EIS assumes water present from the start.

54/1

The report cites "other disciplines" that it claims were not called upon in the preparation of the EIS. First, this is untrue as reference to the EIS can show. Second, the use of a "critical group" allows for much of what these disciplines could provide. Third, these disciplines will be more relevant to the siting stage than to concept assessment. Fourth, their input could affect only the biosphere model, and the technical assessment has shown that the overall model is sufficiently robust to allow for local uncertainties.

54/1

There is no justification for claiming that non-expert stakeholders were not involved in defining risk factors. That was one of the functions of the Panel's hearings.

54/2

If public safety issues have not been comprehensively identified in the Panel's existence of over eight years, that is the Panel's fault.

55/1

The fact that the CCEER was not satisfied by AECL's participation exercises should not carry much weight. Detailed rebuttals to the errors and misleading statements in their submissions were provided in other submissions but the CCEER provided no response.

55/1

The EIS did indeed consider the potential health risk for Aboriginals through use of the "critical group". The Panel should state in what respect it believes that this does not cover Aboriginals.

55/2

The Panel should be careful in rejecting a project because of its potential for "social turmoil and opposition". This would make all society's activities vulnerable to activist minorities willing to act illegally. There are several recent examples of Canadian governments doing what they consider to be in the interest of the population as a whole despite illegal and sometimes violent opposition.

55/2

It is simply untrue to claim: "Many of the operations that will be carried out routinely will be unique to this type of facility". There is long experience in Canada of the transportation of used fuel, hard-rock mining and the manipulation of highly radioactive material. AECL's case studies provided sufficient confidence to the Panel's majority faction, and to several expert advisory groups. The minority faction's lack of confidence appears to be based on the misunderstanding that there is no evidence that human health has been protected in projects of a similar nature and size. Workers affected by the proposed facility would be subject to the same, or more restrictive, radiation limits for nuclear power stations; and large epidemiological studies have demonstrated that their workers have been protected. The public is even better protected.

55/2

The concept is designed so that institutional controls are not necessary but this does not prevent ongoing institutional controls if they are wanted. Similarly, long-term monitoring, which need not necessarily be intrusive, could also be incorporated. These are aspects of the "flexibility" that this section discusses. However, the report criticizes "no definition of the range within which site conditions could vary", i.e., the concept is criticized for being too flexible.

56/2

The minority faction's treatment of "Feasibility of implementation" ignores the technical implementation, which their more qualified colleagues believe to be feasible, and considers only the likelihood of finding an acceptable site. The EIS did propose siting exclusion criteria so presumably the criticism here is these were insufficient. However, to include more than essential criteria at the concept stage would be contrary to the objective of participation that this faction embraces. As much as possible the setting of exclusion criteria should be left up to the potential host communities at the siting stage, to decide in the light of their own local priorities. The argument assumes implicitly that potential sites should be ranked for priority but the report itself has stressed that community acceptance should be at least as important as the more technical factors in the choice of a site. Also, the Panel's terms of reference did not require it to identify a means for finding the best site, but to advise whether the concept is safe and acceptable. The fact that "there were contrary views from many participants" could have been predicted: the Panel should have determined the validity of these views.

57/2

Judging by the quality of submissions by "social scientists and ethicists" they have little of value to contribute to the discussion. These were severely criticized in other submissions and the Panel has failed to recognize the controversy, let alone resolve it.

58/1

As already pointed out, acceptance does not mean broad public support and the public cannot be made to know anything, or to participate. The Panel admits here to doubts as to how representative of the public participants were; and provides no information on the basis for its belief that "significant numbers of the public" are opposed to the concept. Even if this were true, significant numbers could still be a minute percentage.

59/1

"Safety from a social perspective" is an abuse of the language. If it means perceived safety it must be admitted that this is a factor against acceptance, but not cause for rejection. However, the same factor would count against the only practicable alternative, indefinite storage, that the Panel is recommending, de facto. Responsible governments cannot deny their people something with acknowledged benefits just because it is generally believed to be less safe than it actually is. Also the Panel has failed to examine how much of the perceived lack of safety is derived from false assumptions that were pointed out to the Panel but ignored by it in the report.

59/1

In discussing whether the concept was developed "within a sound ethical and social assessment framework", just quoting what some participants disliked without giving any indication of the counterarguments in other submissions is unfair and suggests prejudice. Throughout the report, the Panel predominantly cites participants who were critical of the concept, and ignores rebuttals that were submitted. Here again, the Panel should have resolved these differences. To excuse this lack of resolution by stating: "This question requires further examination in the context of an ethical and social framework" at the end of a process lasting nine years is ridiculous. Supreme irony is to be found in the following sentence: "The panel's view is that, while greater attention should be paid to an enlarged choice for future generations, the present generation should not use this as a basis to justify postponing decisions indefinitely".