"Choosing a Way Forward" Final Study by the Nuclear Waste Management Organization"

Review and Comment by J.A.L. Robertson

The Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO), charged by the Federal Government to recommend an appropriate long-term management approach for used nuclear fuel, has submitted its Final Study. This opens with "Three short years ago the NWMO took on the mission...." However, the essential recommendation, eventual containment and isolation of nuclear fuel wastes in a deep geological repository, is what the nuclear industry has been recommending for three long decades. This concept was endorsed by the Hare Committee (1977), Ontario's Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning (1978), the Federal and Ontario Governments (1978), the Parliamentary Committee on Energy Mines and Resources (1987) and the Blair Seaborn (BS) Panel's Scientific Review Group (1998).

The NWMO confirmed that each of the three options that it was required to examine, deep geological disposal, storage at reactor sites and centralized storage, is "credible and could be designed to be safe for the near term" at least. However, as a result of its assessments it recommended a fourth option that included many of the advantages of the other three while minimizing their limitations. This consisted of initial on-site storage and eventual deep geological disposal with the option of interim centralized storage.

Where the NWMO offers originality is in the means to reach the end, presented in a manner to achieve public acceptance. It proposes an Adaptive Phased Management (APM) approach that would "build on sequential decision-making which would preserve flexibility during implementation ..." to allow for any new developments. To those familiar with major engineering projects this seems like normal practice, e.g., the decision to change the NPD reactor design from pressure-vessel to pressure-tube in the light of zirconium developments. However, the terminology is worthwhile if it reassures members of the public that they are not writing a blank cheque but that they will have the opportunity for further input along the way.

From its start the NWMO has stressed the need for ethics in any assessment, initially as a separate issue. Over its life it has come to realize that ethics, like safety, must be embedded in every decision. Documents show that this has been the industry's position since at least 1975. The 1994 Environmental Impact Statement submitted to the BS Panel included a 263-page volume on "Public Involvement and Social Aspects" that had a chapter on "Ethical Considerations".

In view of the BS Panel's rejection of the deep geological concept on the unreasonable grounds that "broad public support" for it had not been demonstrated (see www.magma.ca/jalrober/Blundera.htm), the NWMO devoted much effort to engaging the public, emphasizing "Dialogue". Although it is difficult to imagine what more could have been done, the response was disappointing: the report refers to "thousands" involved, out of more than 30 million Canadians. This apparently negative result is reassuring in that the vast majority of Canadians are not sufficiently concerned by nuclear wastes to take the trouble to participate.

The NWMO has implicitly retained the separation of concept acceptance and siting introduced in 1977 to address the Not In My BackYard (NIMBY) effect that was impeding field studies.

The NWMO proposes a very conservative, i.e., extended, schedule of 30 years for siting and preparing for a central storage facility (CSF); 30 years for operating the facility and preparing for a deep geological repository; and a further indefinite period to construct and emplace used fuel in the repository. A draft of the report simply assumed that the CSF would be needed but the Final Study states that it is "optional". Unless a cost-benefit assessment demonstrates the need, much time and money could be saved. Similarly for an "underground characterization facility" that was termed a "laboratory" in the draft. Work to characterize a proposed site will certainly be needed but the NWMO will have to identify what more is required beyond what is available from the Underground Research Laboratory at Whiteshell, Manitoba, and from international cooperative programs. APM allows for these where justified. To adapt Mackenzie King on conscription in WW-II: "Facilities where necessary but not necessarily facilities."

The Final Study is weightier than most family bibles. Like the bible, it will be quoted selectively by both sides in an argument. I suggest that the Canadian nuclear industry should endorse and support the "NWMO's Recommendation", as worded in point form on page 44 of the report.

What next? It is now up to the Federal Government to approve implementation of the NWMO Recommendation. Past governments have dodged what was considered to be an unpopular decision by calling for further inquiries. Whatever is decided, a vociferous minority will continue to oppose nuclear energy. However, politicians should be encouraged by public opinion polls showing a majority in favour of nuclear energy and the NWMO's finding that most of those who expressed interest want us to get on with safe and responsible management of the wastes. CNS members should urge their MPs to implement the recommendation.

The NWMO should take advantage of the wait to develop an approach to siting, learning from the experience of the Low Level Radioactive Wastes Task Forces. Prior to implementation the NWMO should increase its staff: the present staff is strong on social sciences, appropriate to its past mission, but weak on physical sciences and engineering. At least one senior engineer, experienced in the design and construction of a major project is essential even if the actual work is to be contracted out.