While I am fully committed to a better public understanding of the nuclear energy issues, and have devoted much personal effort to that end, I am not convinced that these hearings will achieve that objective. Indeed, for reasons to be explained later in this brief, I suspect that the opposite will actually occur. I hope to be proven wrong.
Despite my misgivings, I am presenting this brief as a personal statement, because I sincerely believe that the judicious use of nuclear energy offers great benefits to Canada and to the world as a whole, and because I do not want my descendants to be denied it as an option. I therefore feel an obligation to present my arguments and to be prepared to explain and defend them.
This brief consists of four parts:
My brief does not attempt to be encyclopedic or highly technical, if only because this panel has neither the time nor the resources to examine all the technical issues in the depth necessary to reach sound judgments. Rather, it presents some points of view that otherwise might not be heard.
Although the background document talks of moral, ethical and spiritual issues, I have chosen to deal exclusively in terms of ethics. While the distinction is admittedly blurred, I believe that in common usage morals are more transitory than ethics and tend to represent public opinion at the time. Thus one talks of Victorian morals or the morality of the 1960s; and sexual morality is constantly changing. Even more ephemeral is fashion. In the 1950s it was fashionable for "environmentalists" and "liberals" to be pronuclear; now it is fashionable to be anti-nuclear. In my opinion, ethics represents something more permanent and fundamental. My own approach to ethics is pragmatic, rather than academic, and is largely based on personal conscience.
Any determination of the ethics of technological applications must involve value judgments. Despite frequent but unsubstantiated caricatures of "technocrats" who deny the need for value judgments, I can think of no such individual in the Canadian nuclear program. I believe that value judgments should be made by the community as whole, but my concern is that these judgments are being made in the absence of available facts, or even based on "facts" that my colleagues and I believe to be false or misleading.
In reaching political decisions a willingness to compromise is essential, and in the interpretation of facts there is room for reasonable disagreement between reasonable people. But in questions of scientific fact there is no virtue in compromising truth with falsehood, just as in ethics it would be meaningless to compromise good with evil. I am therefore appealing to those wishing to make value judgments on important public issues to take the time and trouble to establish the underlying facts. More strongly, I would accuse those in positions of trust who pronounce on these issues without establishing the facts of being irresponsible and unethical.
Along with many of my colleagues, I am promoting the judicious use of nuclear energy. We recognize that it is not perfectly safe in an absolute sense --- nothing is --- and that it is not a panacea, but our own value judgment based on the facts as we understand them is that its benefits far outweigh its costs and risks.
If our critics are correct in a substantial number of their allegations, we in the nuclear industry are unethical to be promoting a harmful technology, however good our intentions. Conversely, if we, who are no less sincere than these critics, are correct in believing that nuclear energy is a natural force offering immense present and potential benefits to mankind, we would be unethical not to be promoting its use. Furthermore, if we are correct, those opposing nuclear energy must accept ethical responsibility for causing deaths, human suffering and environmental damage. Too often judgments on nuclear energy are arrived at in isolation without consideration of the practical consequences of implementing the judgment. Any technology can be rejected by concentrating on its deficiencies and ignoring the consequences of foregoing it.
Probably the greatest difficulty that any of us has as a lay citizen in reaching value judgments on technological issues is in knowing how to deal with disagreement between alleged experts. This is a major problem for our society in today's technological world, and one that is not made any easier by media treatment of the issues. Whether the issue is acid rain, the green-house effect of carbon dioxide, the effects of aerosols on the ozone layer, the limits to growth or the biological effects of radiation, one can count on the media reporting preferentially allegations and theories likely to arouse fear or outrage. Subsequent rebuttals, or the results of thorough studies that prove reassuring, are considered to be much less newsworthy. A fair balance is thought to be achieved by giving equal time to both sides of a controversy, without informing the public of the strength of support for the two sides, or of the qualifications and accountability of the adversaries. As a result, even if the vast majority of the scientific community is agreed on the facts and their interpretation a few mavericks can give the impression that the experts are divided. Under these circumstances, the public feels it can trust neither side.
The right to dissent from conventional thinking is important and a valuable help both in advancing science and in protecting society. However, society has to learn how to deal with the resulting controversy.
I know of no easy solution. In principle an individual or a commission can investigate the technical aspects of the issue in sufficient detail to reach their own conclusions. In the example with which I am most familiar, the biological effects of radiation, the scientific evidence and the arguments are well documented and in the public domain. Also, the technical content is not particularly difficult. However, simply digesting what has been published on the subject would take months. Few of us can afford this time for a single issue, let alone all the issues that affect us.
A secondary approach, which I consider more practical in reaching my own conclusions, is to assess the methods that have been employed in arriving at the conventional thinking, the relative confidence to be placed in the adversaries, the nature of and the results from previous inquiries, and the magnitude of the consequences if the conventional thinking is wrong and the critic right.
Let me apply this approach to some of the controversial questions related to nuclear energy.
The only significant health risk from nuclear energy, whether from the operation of nuclear reactors or from the disposal of nuclear wastes, is due to the biological effects of radiation, specifically ionizing radiation. The radiation from nuclear reactors and wastes is similar in its effects to medical X-rays and to the natural radiation that has existed since the beginning of the universe. The average Canadian receives much less than one per cent of his or her total radiation from activities of the nuclear industry; and even some hypothetical individual spending full tine at the boundary of a nuclear-electric generating station would receive only a few per cent of his or her total radiation from that station. By moving away from the station the individual could very well be exposed to higher levels of radiation, since contributions from living indoors, from living at higher altitudes, and from taking airline flights could easily exceed that from the nuclear station. These are facts, not in dispute, that can help an individual assess the magnitude of the risk.
The question in dispute is the numerical magnitude of the risk associated with the relatively small amount of radiation attributable to nuclear energy. Critics often claim that there is no safe level of radiation so that anything above the natural background level should be avoided. The fact is that harmful effects have been observed only at relatively high levels, but the conventional thinking is that, as a prudent measure, the safety standards should be set on the assumption that the risk is linearly proportional to the level of radiation. This is referred to as "the linear hypothesis".
The same conventional thinking, or majority view, has provided estimates of the risks to the public and workers from the generation of nuclear electricity; of the comparable risks to generate the same amount of electricity from coal-fired plants; and of the number of cigarettes that would have to be smoked to give the same risk of death from cancer, as an easily understood yardstick with which to measure the risk.
The first conclusion is that using coal-fired plants instead of nuclear ones would almost certainly cause more deaths. Secondly, the risk to the most exposed member of the public from living adjacent to a nuclear generating station is equivalent to smoking less than one cigarette per year*.
* For those who dislike the smokiong comparison, the risk of smoking one cigarette can be replaced by the risk of being in a smoke-filled room for 15 minutes, or of eating ten peanut-butter sandwiches.
The risk to plant workers can be higher, but is still less than that of smoking ten cigarettes per week. It is knowledge such as this that gives my colleagues and me the confidence to live and raise families close to nuclear plants, and to promote nuclear energy as a safe technology which has the net effect of saving lives.
It should be recognized that the estimates just quoted are not facts, but are interpretations of facts. It is important, therefore, to examine their bases. The conventional thinking on the biological effects of radiation is largely based on the findings of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). This independent body of respected scientists from the medical and biological sciences regularly reviews all relevant evidence, most of which is published in the peer-refereed scientific literature. Further independent checks are provided by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) and by the US National Academy of Science's Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiations (BEIR), whose findings generally confirm those of the ICRP. Most national regulatory bodies, including Canada's Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), base their permissible levels of radiation on ICRP recommendations. In Canada, the nuclear industry has accepted as design and operating targets that radioactive releases should not exceed one per cent of the regulatory limit. Several independent studies have compared the relative risks from nuclear and coal-fired electricity, but the one most frequently quoted was conducted by the American Medical Association (AMA). The estimates of the risk from smoking are derived from studies by the US Surgeon-General. None of these authorities, ICRP, UNSCEAR, BEIR, AMA or the US Surgeon-General, owes allegiance to the nuclear industry (although a few of their members are drawn from that industry) and their studies are fully open to scrutiny.
Naturally, there is not complete unanimity on these findings. Some reputable scientists consider that the linear hypothesis over-estimates the risk, while others consider that it under-estimates the risk. The point here is not so much that the dissent is confined to very few individuals --- the minority can be right --- but that the dissenting views have been thoroughly examined before being rejected with cause.
If this panel has any doubts on these points I would recommend reading "Low-level Radiation: A Review of Current Estimates of Hazards to Human Populations" (Report AECL-5715 (Rev. 1) 1982, 90pp., 121 references) by Dr. D.K. Myers. Panel members could then judge for themselves the quality of technical advice being provided to regulatory bodies, and to anyone else who may be interested. Myers devotes a separate section (pp.81 - 86) to consideration of "Divergent Views on Risk Estimates".
During the past year the Australian Science and Technology Council submitted a report "Australia's Role in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle" to their Prime Minister, in response to his earlier request. The "overall conclusion (of the report) is that Australia will be best able to make a significant contribution (to the cause of non-proliferation and world peace) if it is actively involved in the nuclear fuel cycle." More specifically:
Similar comments apply to other criticisms of the conventional thinking. At least as important is the numerical magnitude of the risk that is in dispute. If all these scientific authorities are wrong and the mavericks are right, the risk to the most exposed member of the public from a nuclear generating station would be equivalent to that from smoking a few tens of cigarettes each year. That is the measure of the much publicized controversy.
This is certainly not the impression of the risk, and of the uncertainty in its value, that the public gains from the statements of some nuclear critics. Since nothing in life is absolutely safe, or known with complete certainty, it will always be possible to scare people by talking only of the risk and its uncertainty, without giving the magnitude of the risk, or providing any comparison. And once people are scared, it is very difficult to unscare them.
Many critics crusade against the radiation from nuclear energy, but fail to attack air-lines, hotels in Banff or owners of high-rise apartments for exposing the public to comparable amounts of radiation. Much higher amounts of radiation can result from natural radon in poorly ventilated buildings, but certain critics continue to promote energy conservation as a substitute for nuclear energy without warning of this much greater risk due to the same radiation. A double standard is being applied, to the detriment of nuclear energy.
The question of a major accident at a nuclear generating station requires similar treatment, obtaining numerical estimates of the risk and putting it into the context of more familiar risks. The worst North American accident to date, at Three Mile Island in 1979, caused no deaths or injuries and resulted in the most exposed member of the public receiving additional radiation equivalent to smoking about ten cigarettes. The worst Canadian accident to date, the pressure tube rupture at Pickering in 1983, did not even result in any public exposure to radiation. For comparison, 1662 people died worldwide (84 in Canada) in the 16 worst energy-related accidents during 1982. Those trying to stop nuclear energy are concerned about the possible deaths from nuclear accidents that may or may not happen, while ignoring the hundreds of actual deaths that continue to occur every year as a result of using other energy systems.
In any other industry, from transportation to pharmaceuticals, an event such as the Pickering pressure tube rupture would not be regarded as an accident, but as simply a component failure. Our problem is that we have no record of true accidents, as generally understood, on which to base statistics. We therefore have to calculate the risk of such accidents. Whatever one may feel about nuclear energy, this dilemma is going to apply to all safe activities. Are we going to ban all safe activities for which there are no accident statistics, and allow only those activities that are proven to be unsafe? This sounds nonsense, but it is what would result from a moratorium on nuclear energy, such as that called for in a rump session of the World Council of Churches at Boston in 1979.
Although our calculations allow for all conceivable ways by which a serious accident could occur, our critics argue that we could have overlooked something. However, this argument applies equally to the alternatives and so cannot be useful in deciding between them. Another way in which the criticism is expressed is that we still have relatively little experience on which to base our calculations --- a few thousand reactor-years. However, reactors are made up of pipes, valves and other components for which engineers have very extensive experience. That is the basis for the "fault-tree" analysis to estimate the probabilities and consequences of conceivable accidents. Claims that "the nuclear industry said that such-and such could not happen" are in direct contradiction with analyses that have estimated the probability of it happening. They are also inconsistent with the existence of back-up devices to provide protection in the event it should happen.
The absence of disastrous nuclear accidents is no accident. A Nobel Laureate, Hannes Alfven, is often quoted as saying that nuclear energy is safe only if everything operates perfectly: "No Acts of God can be permitted". This is simply untrue. Knowing that equipment fails, that humans make errors and that Acts of God occur, designers design reactors to be safe under real life conditions.
In Canada, the utility that owns the station has the prime responsibility for safety. An independent check is provided by the federal regulatory body, the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), that is responsible for licensing the station. Over twenty other bodies have to be satisfied on various aspects during the licensing process. The safety of Canadian nuclear generating stations, and the procedures to ensure that safety, were examined thoroughly by two Ontario public inquiries: the Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning and the Legislature's Select Committee on Ontario Hydro Affairs. Some recommendations were made to improve the procedures, but the stations were found to be acceptably safe and their continued operation endorsed.
The disposal of wastes from nuclear generating stations represents another question causing public concern over nuclear energy. Here too, a frequently quoted statement is simply untrue: "There is no known method for disposing of these wastes". There is broad international consensus that deep underground disposal in a stable geological formation, having first immobilized the wastes in a corrosion-resistant form, is a safe and responsible concept. Worldwide, several independent inquiries have expressed their confidence in the proposed method: here, in Canada, a Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), consisting of the chairman Prof. L.W. Shemilt of McMaster University and 11 other members nominated by major scientific and engineering societies in Canada, stated in its Fourth Annual Report:
The Australian report that has already been mentioned said:
It might be defensible to claim that no solution has yet been demonstrated, but even this statement would be controversial. One can argue that nature, by locking up toxic elements such as mercury and arsenic in insoluble ores buried beneath the earth's surface has demonstrated the validity of the concept. The history of the natural fission reactors that operated for hundreds of thousands of years about two billion years ago at Oklo in West Africa, provides an even more direct demonstration. There the plutonium and fission product wastes, identical to those produced nowadays in the fuel of nuclear generating stations, decayed away harmlessly in situ. The Oklo experience serves as a reminder that nuclear energy, with its associated plutonium, fission products, radioactivity, and ionizing radiation, is a perfectly natural phenomenon. Not only did nuclear fission reactors occur at Oklo, every star in the sky is a nuclear fusion reactor.
Members of the public, obtaining their information largely through the media, are well aware of the criticisms of nuclear energy, but are much less familiar with the favourable findings of the many inquiries that have already been held. While some resolutions and opinion polls support the critics' position, all thorough national and international inquiries have endorsed the benefits of nuclear energy. However, past experience has shown that while the critics' charges and allegations at these inquiries get extensive media coverage, the rebuttals and final conclusions of the inquiries pass almost unnoticed. As a result, my own reluctant conclusion is that most of these inquiries, despite all good intentions, have actually contributed more to public alarm and confusion than to enlightenment.
Statements on nuclear energy by church spokesmen have been, and still are, diverse. In the 1950s there was almost unanimous support for nuclear energy: now there is much less agreement and the majority view is probably hostile. If the churches were subject to the same Catch-22 as is nuclear energy, the public would conclude that their experts are divided and so should be disregarded. I personally find it notable that where a church study did attempt to base its conclusions on available technical knowledge, as for the Methodist Church in England in its 1981 report "Shaping Tomorrow", the result was the following very moderate statements:
The churches sponsoring these hearings must accept responsibility for their consequences. The scope of the hearings is very ambitious, in that they propose to cover again in a mere two weeks topics that occupied well staffed public inquiries for months if not years. It is difficult to see how justice can be done to the vast amount of evidence available in such a short time. It is even more difficult to see how these hearings can succeed, where previous more thorough inquiries have failed, in helping the public understand issues that are now very confused. If, as a result of these hearings, public acceptance of a safe and beneficial technology is made more difficult, the church leaders concerned will bear a heavy ethical responsibility but will not, of course, be legally accountable to anyone.
In recent years, attacks by activists have undermined our society's confidence and trust in many of its institutions, including the integrity of governments, regulatory bodies and police forces. The activists are not alone responsible for the situation and many of the attacks can no doubt be justified. However, trust once lost can rarely be regained and our society is the poorer as a result. The churches, as another of our institutions, should realize that their credibility will be judged by how they handle the ethical aspects of modern technologies. If those of us who understand something of the nuclear issues do not have confidence in the outcome of these hearings we are unlikely to trust the churches pronouncements on other technological subjects.
Already there is regrettable evidence of a lack of mutual trust between the churches and the technical community. The brief to the AECB on its proposed regulatory policy statement on deep geological disposal of high-level radioactive waste in crystalline (plutonic) rock by the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility suggests an unwillingness to trust not only the Canadian nuclear industry but also regulatory bodies, the government and independent commissions. On the other hand, when a thousand scientists, randomly sampled from the pages of "American Men and Women of Science", were asked which specified groups they would want to have a great deal of influence over nuclear energy development, only two per cent favoured "Religious Leaders" (the same as for "News Media") compared with 24 per cent for "Informed Public".
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