The submissions by P. Timmerman et al. and the United Church of Canada (124), for which Timmerman was a consultant, are the best publications of which I am aware on the ethics of nuclear energy from the standpoint of a nuclear critic - better in their systematic presentation than anything I have written on the subject. Of the two, this one is the more moderate, permitting a civilized discussion of the issues. Nothing in the foregoing should be quoted out of context to imply that I endorse the authors' arguments.
After rereading my comments that follow I addressed the key question arising from this submission: "How can two people, both presumably sincere, arrive at diametrally opposed conclusions from very similar basic beliefs?" I now believe that this can be largely explained by the absence from this and other submissions dealing with ethics of an ethical proposition that I consider important:
In making ethical decisions in real life the consequences of the course being examined and of realistic alternatives must be considered.
Often two or more widely accepted general ethical principles are mutually inconsistent so that the choice cannot be "ethical" but has to be "more ethical". I call this my Consequences and Alternatives, or C&A, proposition.
I whole-heartedly agree with the statement (p.7): "we do not believe that ethical ... issues can be divorced from social, economic, and scientific facts". In one of my own submissions I have argued that facts matter: good intentions are not good enough. The importance of this will emerge in discussion of the issues. If these other factors can affect a strictly technical risk-assessment, by the same token they should affect strictly academic ethical principles. Thus real-life decision-making on controversial issues such as the death penalty and contraception, have to have regard to public opinion as well as the dictates of professional ethicists.
It is not doing justice to the present "framework" to label it simply modified "utilitarianism". Through the AECB's endorsement, supported by the industry, of the ICRP's Principles the risk to humans from radiation exposure is optimized (not minimized) for the benefit of society as whole, having regard for economic and social factors, but subject to a limit of the risk to which the most vulnerable individuals may be exposed.
One can debate the optimization and the level of the limit but I submit that this general principle is ethically defensible and in advance of the bases for regulation in most other sectors.
While I accept that the first paragraph fairly represents AECL's position, I note my opposition to minimizing the burden on future generations and my belief that they should not have to take any undue action to protect themselves. Briefly, I argue that they will inherit some of the benefits and that this and other factors should be taken into account in providing a fair risk/benefit balance for them as for us. (See my submission for elaboration of this point and for my reservations on AECL's five "central ethical norms").
I support "best practice" only if "best" includes all factors, including cost, and not just safest. As explained in my submission, making one sector much safer than others results in fewer resources being available to improve safety in the other sectors, and thus reduces overall safety. This would be unethical. N. Rubin, in submission 041, reports the SRG calling for "good engineering practice".
The current position that I have outlined does not depend on an assumption of negligible risk (there is no such thing as zero risk). All it requires is the ability to devise a solution that will not expose any individual to the legal limit: after that it is optimization below that limit. The current review will determine whether this is feasible.
The requirement that the "critical group" not be exposed to some limiting level of risk is an integral part of the current "framework" and does not "bedevil" it as claimed.
In referring to "voluntariness" it is an omission to ignore the experience of Siting Task Force (STF) for low-level radioactive wastes.
The argument that nothing be barred from the discussion is an appealing one. I have argued that nobody wants wastes for themselves so that the benefits from the process resulting in the wastes have to be considered. The practical difficulty is that everything is connected to everything else. If the need for nuclear energy is introduced I would want to discuss the ethics of energy use - its wise use is a virtue not a vice. From there it would be necessary to debate the ethics of population control, which the authors of this submission could find divisive. From what is said under Issue 11) it would be necessary to discuss the controversy over the health effects of low-level radiation, including the possibility of hormesis. And so on ad infinitum. Therefore, to achieve some outcome from the Panel's deliberations, boundaries must be placed on the process.
Is this ethical? I maintain that it would have been unethical to have authorized or embarked upon an inquiry for which there was no probable expectation of a conclusion within a reasonable time. This is one aspect of my contention that in making ethical judgements one must accept responsibility for the consequences of one's actions - or inactions.
The major reason for separating concept assessment from site selection, another example of limiting the discussion, is that the NIMBY effect had all but paralyzed the siting of facilities that society needed but which were unpopular. To allow our form of government to work issues have to be dealt with one at a time.
I criticize the process from a diametrally opposed standpoint - that it wastes public resources and time which is ethically wrong. I also oppose intervenor funding on the same ethical grounds. Taxpayers have already funded AECL to research and develop the concept; AECL, with the same public funding, engaged an independent Technical Advisory Committee to review its work; any application of the concept will have to be reviewed and licensed by the publicly funded AECB, which has engaged two independent advisory committees whose activities are again publicly funded; and the Panel with its Scientific Review Group are assessing the concept, funded by the same taxpayers. Those bodies receiving direct funds are subject to audit by the Auditor General of Canada and are accountable, ultimately, to Parliament. I submit that anyone not satisfied with this degree of protection and wishing to intervene has an ethical obligation to find or raise the necessary funds him/herself.
My understanding is that the source of the Globe & Mail report was a report by a consultant commissioned by AECL. I am unaware of AECL having adopted the recommendation as its policy. Unless the authors' of this submission have checked this with AECL it would be unethical to make tha accusation based on a media story. The question of importing wastes is discussed under Issue 17.
Putting boundaries on the discussion of the concept does not negate the principles of openness, fairness and voluntary consent for the process of concept acceptance. I submit that answers to the "many key questions" are to be found in the EIS, in sufficient detail to assess the concept.
To draw valid conclusions from a public opinion poll one would need to know from what information the individuals had formed their opinions. Had they read the EIS? Did they even know what concept is being proposed, let alone the reasons for supporting it?
There is no justification for considering the discovery of nuclear energy to represent "a break in history". This is essentially a construct of the media who discern breaks in history every few months. According to them, we are now in "the information age" and it is "the nuclear age" that is history. There is nothing unique or unnatural about nuclear energy, or about the hazards of its wastes. The widespread belief that a single nuclear explosion could wipe out mankind is a complete myth. It is (in)humanly possible to extinguish humanity but, if this occurs through a total war it is just as likely to be through the use of chemical or biological weapons as through nuclear ones.
While it is true that many of the pressure groups claiming to represent religions are against nuclear energy nowadays, it should be remembered that the same religions strongly favoured it less than fifty years ago. Were they wrong then or are they wrong now? Public opiniom polls can also be invoked to show that "Church hierarchies are outrunning congregrations in the area of political activism" and that "leaders of the largest faiths want to steam ahead with more activism but only six per cent of those surveyed approve of more political involvement by churches." (Carleton School of Journalism's national poll, Interfaith Program for Public Awareness of Nuclear Issues (IPPANI), 1st Week).
The IPPANI review of 1985 was sponsored by five religious faiths. As mentioned in my submission, I was highly critical of both the process and the organizers (not the panelists), particularly of the churches' roles in setting up the process and at the hearings. From my personal involvement with IPPANI I concluded that the IPPANI process was based on the fallacies that faith can substitute for facts, and politics for ethics. (I prepared a detailed, unpublished critique of the IPPANI Report, entitled "A Dissenter's View".)
There may have been little philosophical debate in Canada over nuclear issues, but there has been plenty of opportunity. The necessary information has been openly available, there have been several public inquiries (see AECL-10768), and AECL, the AECB, the three nuclear utilities and the CNA have all tried hard to engage the public. A possible explanation is that the general public does not fear nuclear energy as much as the critics want them to. Most people have only so much time each day for worrying and nuclear energy may not be high on their list of priorities.
I agree that trust is a pivotal factor. That is why the whole process should depend on trust as little as possible, as I have proposed and explained in my submission. To inject some optimism, Canadians do not seem to be rejecting beef as a result of the "mad cow" outbreak in the UK, indicating a trust in the Canadian industry and its regulator.
I am surprised not to find here reference to "sustainable development", an objective that I addressed in my submission.
I suggest that environmentalists who lean towards animal rights have a philosophical difficulty deciding what is a living being. I personally would show no revulsion if smallpox or HIV were rendered extinct. Somewhere in between these and humans, I would mildly regret the extinction of one of the thousands of species of beetles, but this would pale into insignificance compared to the deaths of millions of people due to the lack of electricity for clean water, sanitation and food preservation.
The nuclear industry has been an example to others in "reach(ing) for the long term" as recommended by the authors. This is something of a paradox since most nuclear wastes decay over time while many of the wastes from other industries last forever.
At the end of this issue I was left wondering just what sort of a framework the authors would recommend, and how it differs from that proposed in the EIS.
My comments under Issue 3) discuss why it is impracticable to extend the debate to all interconnected questions. In addition, there are existing wastes that require attention.
The second paragraph under this issue disregards the admirable precept at the start of the submission that ethical issues should not be divorced from facts. The Canadian nuclear industry and its regulator do not refuse to discuss the future of nuclear energy. It is not "off limits" because of "special dangers" or for any other reason. In Canada nuclear energy has been virtually free from secrecy, apart from commercially valuable know-how, for decades. Around 1980 the Chairman of Ontario's Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning contradicted an accusation of the industry's secrecy by nuclear critics, especially Gordon Edwards. Anyone claiming that a "security state" exists in Canada should be invited to visit one of the Visitor Information Centres at nuclear generating stations and laboratories. Contrary to what is said here, the anti-nuclear movement has done its best to foster this myth - successfully it appears from this submission. Anyone propagating the myth should be obliged to state what information has been refused, and the reason given for any refusal.
The submission refers to "the aspirations for the nuclear industry" but fails to state what these are believed to be or where they can be found.
The submission accuses AECL of withholding information. What information has been denied? Has it been requested? What response was given?
The authors appear to be critical of the present process whereby a technical body mandated by the government develops a proposal for public review. Although they do not propose any alternative they seem to be suggesting public participation at a much earlier stage. I suggest that this would lead to unmanageable confusion - "A camel is a horse designed by a committee."
The authors seem unaware of the AECB's procedures for issuing consultative documents for comment before publishing the final regulatory document. In addition, anyone is welcome to make a presentation to the five-person Board at its regular meetings. The AECB has long been doing what this submission recommends. This constitutes another example of how ethical judgements should be based on a sound knowledge of the facts.
Any suggestion that the Panel favoured AECL was ridiculed by its providing a platform for the contemptible street theatre libelling AECL and all its employees, past and present (see my submission of 1990 December 5).
Unlike this submission, my January one offers concrete suggestions for tackling the problem of trust.
As discussed under Issue 7) it is not clear what the social sciences would have had to offer in developing the concept beyond all the surveys, focus groups, etc., described and discussed in the 263 pages of AECL-10712, but not mentioned until later.
It is no criticism of the concept, or of its presentation, to state that the social sciences have most to offer in the siting stage, which is not relevant to the central question of whether the concept is acceptable.
The subject of risk, and the public perception of it is treated extensively in AECL-10712, which I have commented on in my submission.
If "there are questions about how much of (AECL's) documentation has actually been published" these should be stated explicitly to allow AECL the opportunity to respond.
Yes. These are not questions of ethics by definition and should be brought up at Stage 2 of the hearings. The various technical reviews and criticisms referred to here will be assessed at that time.
Since the question of criticality is raised here in a scary manner I would suggest that, if this occurred, it could reproduce the prehistoric natural reactors in the uranium deposits at Oklo in West Africa that "operated" for hundreds of thousands of years without doing any harm to anyone - except scaremongers.
Risk and its perception have been discussed extensively in sections of AECL-10712. From the absence here of any references to that report, cited in the references, one may assume that the authors agree with all that is in it. I do not and have commented on it in my submission.
The "burden-of-proof" argument is appealing. However, if it is applied uniquely, or unevenly, to one alternative it can result in that one being made much safer than the others thus misusing limited resources, as explained in my submission. This is another example of where my C&A proposition is needed.
In a paper cited in my submission I argue that professional risk analysts should assess the risks to the best of their ability, and that their results together with economic estimates and identification of the probable social factors should constitute input to independent decision-makers who are accountable through our system of government. In the present context, the AECB staff provide the technical input while the five-person Board, in making decisions, has to consider and weigh all relevant factors.
Under this issue the authors accuse AECL of bias in its treatment of the health effects of ionizing radiation, but provide little but dogmatic statements to support the accusation. In this controversial area AECL could have been equally criticized for not giving enough attention to the growing body of opinion arguing for a threshold in the linear hypothesis, or even for hormesis (beneficial effects of low doses). The citation "Caufield,1989" is not explained here or in the references.
While it may be true to say that the public has had no say in the currently accepted risk, that is because they have not taken the trouble, not because they have been denied the opportunity - I have already mentioned the AECB's processes for consultative documents and for presentations to the Board. Also, one can argue that one can deduce what is acceptable from people's behaviour, from what they accept daily without question. However, as I have argued, there is no such thing as a single acceptable risk - it depends on the benefits of the application.
The setting of radiation protection standards involves consideration of what is feasible but the description here is misleading. A legal limit is set, which cannot be exceeded under any circumstances; but an operating limit, in the licence, is at a lower level, often by a factor of one hundred, set by optimizing for technical feasibility, economic and social factors.
In stating that "serious genetic effects ... are caused by low levels of ionizing radiation ...." it would be only fair to the reader to mention that such effects have not been observed in humans and that this assumption represents a prudent measure adopted by the AECB in regulating the industry. (A media report of April 25 quotes a study showing inherited genetic mutations in blood attributed to radiation. If this is confirmed it will be the first such evidence in humans.) Conversely, it is not just assumed that protecting humans will protect the environment. There is considerable evidence (see AECL-10720) that man is more susceptible than other mammals, animals, plants and other organisms. Nevertheless, I agree that this issue merits further attention - see my submission.
References to "absolute safety" and "guarantee of safety" indicate a failure to recognize reality - there is no such thing as absolute safety, or of a guarantee of it. Again, an unrealistic goal is being set, making it inevitable that the goal will be missed. Radiation protection standards are criticized for "compromises" but any consideration of factors such as public opinion or costs requires that strictly technical assessments be "compromised". As already explained, disregarding costs could harm overall safety.
In quoting selectively from the AECB's R-104 this submission fails to inform the reader of the next sentence:
Thus the first of the two criticisms in this issue is invalid.
The second criticism is similarly invalidated by a proper reading of R-104. The basic criterion in that document is in fact risk-based:
The conversion factor used to calculate permissible releases from this risk can be varied in accord with current scientific consensus, usually that recommended by the ICRP. The EIS was prepared using the current conversion factor. I believe that by the time any application for a construction licence AECB regulations will require use of the ICRP's latest recommendation.
In connection with the criticality scare (which should be discussed in the technical hearings) the reader should be informed of the Oklo experience. This shows how the plutonium formed in naturally occurring reactors decayed away without significant movement.
I dispute that the public find it easier to understand risk in mathematical terms than to understand releases. I defend R-104 but I prefer explanations based on comparing radiation doses with those occurring naturally, and releases with natural concentrations in rivers, etc., and the variation of these quantities.
The discussion here confuses the concepts and their (mis)applications. Criticizing the storage of nuclear fuel in Canada because of mismanagement of chemical wastes at the Love Canal is akin to rejecting the concept of Christianity because of the abuses during the Inquisition and other times.
The question of releases beyond 10,000 years has been discussed under Issue 12).The discussion here omits mention of the principle that the industry responsible for wastes should be responsible for their safe and responsible disposal. Also the ethics of procrastination is ignored: the submission's conclusion, viz., that "three lines of investigation should proceed simultaneously", would simply delay a decision.
The discussion here, like the EIS, presents an unnecessary dichotomy. I have argued in my submission for examination of the current generation developing the technology, mining the repository, emplacing the wastes and stockpiling the back-fill and sealing materials, but not sealing the repository.
One of the strongest ethical arguments against irretrievability, ignored here, is that future generations would be denied a vast energy source.
The AECB's R-104 is again misinterpreted. It states:
I.e., retrieval is not intended, but it is not prohibited. Whether weapons-plutonium is burned or not (a matter for a separate EIS), used fuel would contain some unburned fissile material capable in principle of being recovered from a disposal repository. The logistics of the hypothetical recovery would be such that this could only be done by a government, not terrorists, and there is no way that a government could be prevented from doing it, given unlimited time and resources. Thus this is a (relatively minor) problem facing society that is irrelevant to assessment of the concept.
It is simply untrue that "the best approach ... has never come forward for public debate" - see AECL-10768. There is no evidence that "the public", as opposed to special interest groups, "consider that it must be debated now". There is a wide international consensus favouring deep geological burial, and no realistic alternative has been proposed. Subduction is attractive technically, but the political and social barriers appear formidable.
I have disputed that the ethical principle should be "eliminating/minimizing the burden to future generations ...." (my emphasis); and that the wastes "threaten the continuation of life systems on the earth".
In this respect, as in all other areas of life, it is impossible to do everything. Informed judgement must be exercised. A well qualified and independent group, the AECL Research and Development Advisory Panel, has recommended against diverting limited resources to investigate alternative disposal methodology. The authors of this submission characterize this as "regrettable" without providing any reason for why their judgement is superior to that of the Panel.
This proposal is not part of the present EIS and so is not relevant to the Panel's hearings. If the various governments concerned were to propose this, it would presumably form the subject of another EIS. The discussion here somehow overlooks that it is ethically desirable to reduce the amount and accessibility of weapons plutonium.
It is easy to make unsubstantiated allegations that raise scares, as in this submission:
It takes far more space, time and attention to argue why such scenarios are highly improbable - see the paper attached to my own submission. Since this topic lies outside the Panel's mandate, it will presumably not be discussed at the hearings and so the allegations will go unchallenged and become part of the anti-nuclear mythology. What are the ethics of publishing a one-sided presentation on a scary issue, knowing it to be outside the Panel's mandate?
It is true that the used MOX fuel would release more heat than natural uranium fuel, in the very long term. However, by then the heat output of both would be extremely low and would not be a limiting factor in the design or operation of the facility.
MOX fuel can be, and has been, managed normally under IAEA-coordinated "safeguards". The authors should be required to substantiate their allegation to the contrary.
The discussion of this issue again makes unsubstantiated allegations concerning theft of shipments and diversion. It ignores all the experience that already exists, e.g., between Japan and France. The main risk to date has been from anti-nuclear agitators.
I dispute that there is a principle "that wastes should be disposed of as close as possible to their point of production" (my emphasis). This is only one factor that should be considered. Very simply, it is inconsistent with the demand in Issue 11) that safety should not be compromised. The use of "dumped" is prejudicial and completely inappropriate for the present EIS. The principle endorsed here, "that primary responsibility for wastes rests with those who generate them" should be remembered when discussing who should be the Implementing Organization.
The suggestion that AECL could help set up regional disposal facilities depends on Canada having its own relevant experience. Some of the proposed regional cooperatives, e.g., China and South Korea, appear politically naive.
In a submission supposedly concerned with ethics there is no mention of the hypothetical argument, outlined in my submission, that if the disposal of used fuel were judged safe in Canada, but unsafe in Holland, say, there would be an ethical reason to accept Holland's wastes.
The issue of decommissioning nuclear power plants is outside the Panel's mandate.
The allegation "Many significant costs were omitted" should be substantiated or withdrawn.
The estimated cost of the facility is very large, but so too is the value of the electricity generated from the used fuel to go into it. As a result, the estimated cost of waste disposal is about two per cent of the cost of the electricity. This perspective, not provided in the submission, shows that there is no need to accept foreign wastes or to burn weapons plutonium to make the proposal financially viable. Much of the estimated cost is for hard-rock mining, something of which Canada has a lot of experience, giving a confidence in the estimate that the submission fails to recognize.
"... it is necessary that the information in the estimates be supplemented by disclosure of expected sources of funds" - The reference to Ontario Hydro's 1993 report two paragraphs earlier indicates that the authors are aware that appropriate charges for waste disposal are already included in the utility's electricity rates. Customers are the source and there should be no implication that this fact is being kept secret. The question of how the resulting fund can be protected, one that I too raised in my submission, is a separate matter.
In attaching a document about a significantly different concept in the US there should surely be an obligation to explain the relevance to the present EIS.
| Go to Contents of Reviews |